The Problem of Old Evidence in Bayesian Confirmation Theory: A Solution Based on the Difference Between Update and Justification
Chloé de Canson
LSE; University of Cambridge, GB
For helpful discussions on the topic and comments on this paper, I am greatful to John Worrall, Olivier Roy, Luc Bovens and Alexandru Marcoci.
BSc Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method (2012 - 2015). From October 2015, she will be reading the MPhil Philosophy. Her main areas of interest are in philosophy of science, philosophy of probability and logic.
In this paper, I discuss the problem of old evidence in Bayesian Confirmation Theory and attempt to build on a suggestion by Lange (1999) to provide a satisfactory solution. I present the problem, argue that it cannot be solved by the standard appeal to counterfactuals, and show that a modification of the Bayesian framework along the lines of what Lange proposes is necessary. Then, within that new framework, I show how the problem of old evidence can be solved.
How to Cite:
de Canson, C., 2015. The Problem of Old Evidence in Bayesian Confirmation Theory: A Solution Based on the Difference Between Update and Justification. Rerum Causae, 7(1), pp.82–104.