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Reading: Dynamic Epistemic Confirmation: A Qualitative Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens

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Dynamic Epistemic Confirmation: A Qualitative Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens

Author:

Chloé de Canson

London School of Economics, GB
About Chloé

I would like to thank Alexandru Marcoci for his immensely inspiring and helpful comments.

BSc Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method student (2012-2015). Her main field of interest is philosophy of science, and she hopes to continue in research in that field.

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Abstract

Fitelson and Hawthorne (2006) argue that Hempel’s qualitative response to the paradox of the ravens cannot be satisfactory: they claim firstly that classical deductive logic cannot capture an important distinction needed for Hempel’s solution of the paradox, and secondly, that Hempel’s solution is internally inconsistent. I show that both of these claims rest on a restrictive understanding of Hempel’s solution, and I argue that if confirmation is understood as based on epistemic states, then both these criticisms can be avoided. I finish by giving some reasons to hope that qualitative (dynamic epistemic) and Bayesian confirmation can be unified.

How to Cite: de Canson, C., 2014. Dynamic Epistemic Confirmation: A Qualitative Solution to the Paradox of the Ravens. Rerum Causae, 6(1), pp.55–74.
Published on 01 Jan 2014.
Peer Reviewed

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