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'Having Too Much' and Libertarian Freedom


Yannic Vitz


In this paper I defend libertarianism as a conceptual variant of limitarianism. Limitarianism is a normative claim in distributive justice about the moral impermissibility of being wealthy. Many libertarians believe that entitlement to ownership of worldly resources is contingent on not having violated a proviso – a necessary condition for property rights to arise, e.g. by leaving ‘enough and as good’ for others – and they thus share the generic limitarian commitment. I argue that libertarians believe that being better off than a certain threshold allows is morally impermissible and libertarians accordingly have to accept that a limitarian threshold does not simpliciter constitute a violation of libertarian freedom. I thus argue that Nozick indeed provides a limitarian threshold, albeit a far too weak one.

How to Cite: Vitz, Y., 2019. 'Having Too Much' and Libertarian Freedom. Rerum Causae, 11(1), pp.57–69.
Published on 19 Sep 2019.
Peer Reviewed


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