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Abstract

This essay examines whether deception in negotiation aimed at balancing a disadvantage imposed through discrimination can be permissible, drawing on Carson’s self-defense principle and the Revised Mutual Trust Principle by Dees and Cramton. It is assumed that deception in negotiation can be a useful tactic to gain an advantage over the other negotiating party but is morally wrong. First, it is argued that deception in negotiation aimed at balancing discrimination can be justified as an instance of self-defense, if discrimination is regarded as equally wrong as deception, and the negotiator is likely to be harmed and knows it and if deception is necessary to prevent harm. It is argued that an alternative justification is applicable in more cases: deception aimed at balancing discrimination is justified if the negotiator has no reason to trust the other party not to discriminate against her and if deception is necessary to prevent harm. As both accounts justify deception in negotiation only in few cases, caution is advised when promoting it as a suitable strategy to balance discrimination.

Keywords: Ethics, Negotiation, Deception, Discrimination

How to Cite: Tjaben-Stevens, R., 2019. May I Lie because I'm a Woman?. Rerum Causae, 10(2), pp.87–106.