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Reading: The Practicality of an External World


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The Practicality of an External World


Julius Schwarzwälder

London School of Economics and Political Science, GB
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This essay aims to identify the central epistemological argument of G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’ (hereinafter ‘PEW’) as well as its application in the following scholarly work on it and examines it on the realisation of Moore’s three conditions for a good proof: First (section 1), it checks validity and concludes that both arguments are valid. Second (section 2.1), it considers circularity of the arguments and establishes that a sceptic can rightfully object to Moore as him failing to address her objections by begging the question. Third (section 2.2), it examines soundness and contends that, in spite of 2.1, Moore can know his premises, as, by way of a pragmatist notion of truth, a dissolution of the issue is offering itself cogently. 

How to Cite: Schwarzwälder, J., 2019. The Practicality of an External World. Rerum Causae, 10(1), pp.77–85.
Published on 11 Sep 2019.
Peer Reviewed


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