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Abstract

This essay aims to identify the central epistemological argument of G.E. Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World’ (hereinafter ‘PEW’) as well as its application in the following scholarly work on it and examines it on the realisation of Moore’s three conditions for a good proof: First (section 1), it checks validity and concludes that both arguments are valid. Second (section 2.1), it considers circularity of the arguments and establishes that a sceptic can rightfully object to Moore as him failing to address her objections by begging the question. Third (section 2.2), it examines soundness and contends that, in spite of 2.1, Moore can know his premises, as, by way of a pragmatist notion of truth, a dissolution of the issue is offering itself cogently. 

Keywords: Epistemology, External world, Moore